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Abstract
In the current economy, the cost of damage to the environment is often external, which is likely to
lead to over-exploitation and inadequate provisioning. There are a variety of incentive-based
schemes, such as effluent taxes or tradable permits, which attempt to confront the polluting agents
with a ‘price’ equal to the marginal external cost of their activity. However, competitive incentives
alone are not adequate for effective management of the shared resources. Thus, the current solutions
exhibit several drawbacks including susceptibility to international free-riding, sensitivity to accurate
estimation of cost of pollution or environmental targets, and inability to take the cumulative nature
of pollution and its cost into account.
This paper proposes an approach to eliminate the commons dilemma by using non-scalar numbers
for the underlying economic signals. Rather than adding the cost of pollution to the cost of private
resources, this cost is kept in a separate dimension represented by the second component of money
and price. This separation enables us to develop more effective models for economic signals and
incentives, and avoid the above-mentioned drawbacks. In the proposed design, the cost of pollution
is cumulative and would have a progressively higher economic impact on both the competitive and
cooperative incentives for managing pollution leading to a provable sustainable point. Moreover,
the proposed model does not suffer from the free rider problem; does not require accurate
estimation of the true cost of pollution; is simple to implement and backward compatible with the
current economy.
Key Words: Environmental Economy, Global Commons, Non-Scalar Economy, Incentive-Based
Schemes, Sustainability.
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Introduction

The global environmental resources, such as the atmosphere and the oceans, have been used as
‘waste-sinks’ for many years and the level of pollution is commonly viewed to be excessive. The
current economy is reasonably effective in managing scarce resources that are privately owned.
However, for global commons, the cost of damage is external and the appropriators continue to
engage in pollution until its marginal benefit is zero [1]. This is likely to lead to over-exploitation,
inadequate provisioning and perhaps irreversible damage. In essence, there is a failure of the
doctrine of ‘invisible hand’ and economic agents face a ‘commons dilemma’ since pursuit of their
self-interest may contravene the common good [2].
A variety of incentive-based schemes, such as effluent taxes or tradable permits, have been
proposed to ‘internalize’ this cost and confront the polluting agents with a ‘price’ equal to the
marginal external cost of their activity [1][3]. However, with respect to management of global
resources, there still remain some key weaknesses as outlined below:
a) International free-riding: The commons dilemma favors free-riding as the dominant strategy,
which makes partial agreements ineffective. It is often claimed that compliance reduces the
international competitiveness of one’s country if some other countries do not comply [4]. The
polluting firms could also relocate their operation to such countries creating significant political
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pressure. Consequently, implementation of the above schemes requires global consensus and
enforcement for effectiveness.
b) Sensitivity to accurate evaluation of cost of pollution: For incentive-based schemes to result
in pollution reduction, the marginal cost of pollution should exceed the marginal abatement
cost. However, it is politically difficult to impose high costs on polluters or assess the true cost
of pollution because various competing parties are strongly motivated to give distorted
estimates [6][7]. International agreements on environmental targets also involve intense
lobbying and prolonged negotiations. As a result, the policy objectives are often set
conservatively with suboptimal outcome [3][9][10].
c) Cumulative nature of pollution: The impact of pollution in the real world is cumulative across
time, space and multiple uses, which is not reflected in current schemes[5][11]. A particular
polluting activity may indeed have negligible impact and cost in isolation, but when it is
occurring after centuries of pollution, as part of a large community of polluters and compounded
by other activities that also lead to pollution of the same resource, its impact may become
significant. In other words, history matters and the system cannot be memory-less. The cost of
pollution imposed on an economic agent must be an increasing function of how much pollution
is created by others or this same agent in other contexts.
The objective of this paper is to eliminate the commons dilemma by introducing a new concept of
money and price based on two-dimensional numbers. One of these dimensions is responsible for
managing private property and the other deals with the globally shared environmental resources.
Rather than adding the cost of pollution to the cost of private resources, as is common in current
incentive-based schemes, this cost is kept in a separate dimension represented by the second
component of money and price. This separation enables us to develop more effective models for
economic signals and incentives, and avoid the above-mentioned pitfalls and limitations.
For example, in the proposed model the marginal cost of pollution can be controlled without the
need to accurately estimate the cost of pollution. Moreover, this marginal cost can vary among the
individuals or communities depending on their past polluting behavior and the level of
accumulation of pollution in the economy. Another feature of the proposed design is that during a
purchase operation, the pollution liability represented by the second component of price is
transferred to the buyer’s money from the seller. The buyers, therefore, bear the economic
consequences of supporting the pollution. However, supporting a polluting product does not reduce
one’s wealth or cause transfer of wealth to another party. Since no one benefits from pollution,
there would be no perverse incentives within the economy and the cooperative incentives for
pollution abatement are strengthened.
This conceptual change to non-scalar money and price has a profound impact on both competitive
and cooperative incentives for managing pollution. In particular, the proposed model leads to a
provable equilibrium point, in which the level of per-capita pollution accumulated in the economy
is kept at a constant level. Moreover, it is easy for the society to change this level by adjusting a
single macro-economic parameter, thereby steering the economy towards a sustainable point
(Section 5). In addition, we will demonstrate the following properties for the proposed design:
•

No free-riding: Countries that do not participate in the scheme would be economically
disadvantaged - Section 6.2.

•

The cumulative nature of pollution is taken into account: The cost of pollution is
cumulative and would have progressively higher economic impact - Section 5.

•

No dilemma: There is no conflict between individual desire for economic success and
discharging one’s obligations towards the environment - Section 7.

•

No need for accurate estimation of cost of pollution: Sections 3.2.1 and 5.
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•

Practical to implement and backward compatible: There is no need for a disruptive
introduction as the proposed economy is backward compatible with the current system and a
smooth migration is possible - Section 6.1.

•

Simplicity of basic operations: The basic mathematical operations of the economy (Section 2)
are simple and can be mastered during primary school years.

To limit the scope of this article, the formal mathematical proofs are not included in the current text.
These will be subject of future publications and can be obtained directly from the author.

2

Mathematical Definitions, Operations, and Properties

In this Section, a new class of two-dimensional numbers is introduced to be used as the basis of the
proposed non-scalar money and price. A member of this class, such as x = (x1, x2), has two
components. We require that both components be real numbers and the first component be nonnegative. The set of these numbers could be viewed as coordinates of points on the twodimensional half-plane of real numbers (the other half is excluded because the first component
cannot be negative), see Figure 1.
The first component, x1, is called the Wealth Component (WLC) and is responsible for managing
scarce resources that are privately owned. Accordingly, it performs a role similar to the scalar
money and price and current intuitions about its meaning and function are largely applicable.
The second component, x2, is called the Pollution Liability Component (PLC), which manages the
scarcity of globally shared resources of interest. Note that current understanding about the meaning
of ‘liability’ could be misleading and the PLC role becomes clear as the properties of non-scalar
economy are investigated further in this Section.
Both of these components have the same units of currency, such as dollars. We refer to an economy
based on non-scalar money and price as non-scalar economy, in contrast to the current (scalar)
economy.
Example – price: In non-scalar economy, the price of an item may be $(10, 1.60). This means that
the seller is asking for $10 of Wealth Component (WLC) to compensate for all the privately owned
resources, such as labor, materials, plant, used throughout the supply chain for this product up to
this phase. It also means that the seller is claiming that $1.60 of Pollution Liability Component
(PLC) was incurred in total by all the entities involved (extraction of raw materials, electricity
generation, transport, refrigeration, etc.) to get the product to current stage. It is shown in Section 4
that sellers would have very strong economic incentives to represent the PLC of price as accurately
as possible otherwise they bear an economic cost. It is also shown that this accurate estimation is
very easy for them. As a result, buyers can be confident that the PLC of price is reliable.
Example – money: In non-scalar economy, the balance of someone’s saving account might be
$(100,5). This means that the owner has accumulated $100 of Wealth Component and $5 of
Pollution Liability Component in this account. The role and impact of the latter on the owner’s
buying power will be discussed later in this section.

2.1

The impact of PLC: Index of money and price

Our aim is to find a suitable metric to measure how prominent the second component (PLC) of
money and price is with respect to the first component. As mentioned before, a mere comparison of
magnitudes is not a good indicator. Hence, in this paper for every x = (x1, x2), be it price or money,
we use the ratio x 2 /( x1 + x 2 ) for this purpose. Let us call this metric the Liability Index of x (or
Index of x for short). When the PLC is zero or negative, we define the Index to be zero because a
negative Index is not a useful concept. Therefore, the Liability Index of x, denoted by I(x), is
defined as follows:
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Based on the above definition, the Index of any money or price is always between 0 and 1. The
closer the Index to one, the more prominent is the PLC.

2.2

The Limit on the Index of money

It is not appropriate to impose any limits on the Index of a price, because we would like the price to
reflect the ‘reality’ – that is, the true combination of cost of private and shared resources used in
production. However, for money, the economy should impose a limit on how large the Index could
be. This limit - called the Liability Index Threshold - is mathematically enforced on all the

Figure 1: Two-dimensional half-plane for money and price, Money Domain and LI Threshold

operations of the economy ensuring that the Index of money is always below this threshold (see
Section 2.3). The Liability Index Threshold, or LI Threshold for short, is a number between 0 and 1,
excluding zero, which is assigned to every economic agent, such as an individual, a firm, or a
government department, by the regulator. Also, we will see that the regulator is bound to confine
the Liability Index Thresholds within a certain range based on the environmental efficiency of the
country’s economy (see Section 3.3).
In Figure 1, the locus of all non-scalar numbers with Index equal to the Liability Index Threshold λ
is shown as a thick solid line. For someone whose LI Threshold is λ, the Money Domain is shown
as a shaded area below and including this line. The Index of any number above this area would be
above the LI Threshold and hence these numbers cannot be money.

2.3

Defined operations for money and price

The following mathematical operations are defined for the non-scalar economy.
1- Addition: The familiar component-wise addition is defined for money and price as follows:

( x1 , x 2 ) + ( y1 , y 2 ) ! ( x1 + y1 , x 2 + y 2 )
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This operation could be used to add prices, for example, prices of items in a shopping trolley to get
the total price; or add monies, for example, different account balances to get one’s total money. It is
not meaningful to add a price to money or vice versa.
2- Subtraction: The familiar component-wise subtraction is defined for non-scalar money and
price, provided the result is valid:

( x1 , x 2 ) ! ( y1 , y 2 ) " ( x1 ! y1 , x 2 ! y 2 )
When subtracting prices from each other, the result must be a valid price, that is, with non-negative
WLC. In case of money, for example, withdrawing money from an account, the result must be valid
money, that is, its Liability Index should not exceed the LI Threshold.
It is not meaningful to subtract a price from money or vice versa.
3- Purchase: In the current economy, the purchase operation is a subtraction of price from tendered
money. In non-scalar economy, the purchase operation is not subtraction, but still very simple. Let
the buyer’s money before the purchase be x = (x1, x2) and assume that buyer intends to purchase a
product priced at a = (a1, a2). The buyer’s money after the purchase is obtained by performing a
purchase operation on x and a as defined below.

( x1 , x 2 )  (a1 , a 2 ) " ( x1 ! a1 , x 2 + a 2 )
The purchase operation can take place provided the result is valid money. In other words, the Index
of (x1 - a1, x2 + a2) must not exceed the buyer’s LI Threshold. Otherwise, we say that x does not
have sufficient funds to make this purchase. In the example of Figure 2, $x can purchase an item
priced at $a, but does not have sufficient buying power to purchase $b.

Figure 2: (a) x can purchase a; (b) x cannot purchase b

4- Sell: Assume that seller’s money before the sale is w = (w1, w2). After selling an item priced at a
= (a1, a2), the seller’s money can be calculated as follows:

( w1 , w2 ) s (a1 , a2 ) " ( w1 + a1 , w2 ! a2 )
Again, the result of a sell operation must be valid money.
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The interpretation of purchase and sell operations is straightforward. The buyer pays for the Wealth
Component of price to compensate the seller for all the privately owned resources used in
producing the good. The buyer also accepts the Pollution Liability Component of price, which is
transferred to his money and deducted from seller’s.
The above set of definitions and operations completes the mathematical design of the non-scalar
economy. The rest of this paper attempts to explore the ramifications of living in an economy based
on this design and discusses practical implementation issues.

2.4

Buying Power of money and Magnitude of price

As shown in Figure 2, a buyer is able to purchase a good provided the result of the purchase
operation is valid money. To check affordability, therefore, one can use this operation and examine
the result to see if the purchase can take place. But money and price have two components and the
interplay between these components in determining how expensive the price is, or the amount of
buying power in the money may not be obvious. To assist with understanding and also analysis, in
this section we introduce two useful quantities for this purpose.
Buying Power of money: Consider money x = (x1, x2) shown in Figure 3-(a). After any purchase,
the buyer’s money gets ‘closer’ to the Liability Index Threshold1 (see Figure 2). In fact, if the
buyer’s money is already on the LI Threshold – that is, its Index is equal to the LI Threshold - it
cannot buy anything. For example, money y in Figure 3-(a) still contains wealth (in the sense that
its Wealth Component, WLC, is not zero), but does not have any buying power. Consequently, the
‘distance’ of money from the LI Threshold is a good measure of the amount of buying power.
Formally, we define the Buying Power of money as the Wealth Component of the maximum price
of the form (B,0) that can be purchased. Geometrically, this is the length of the horizontal line
segment between the money and the LI Threshold as shown in Figure 3-(a). Mathematically, the
Buying Power of money x with respect to LI Threshold λ, denoted by Bλ(x) is obtained as follows:

& x # $ x2
if x 2 > 0
1$ %
B" (x) = ' 1
; where " #
.
if x 2 % 0
%
( x1
Note that Buying Power of money is always evaluated with respect to its owner’s LI Threshold.
Also note that Buying Power can never exceed the Wealth Component of money. In other words,
there is no Buying Power in the PLC component of money and even if the PLC is negative or zero,
! at most becomes equal to WLC. For!example, if λ = 0.4 (ρ = 1.5), the Buying
the Buying Power
Power of $(100,5) is $92.5.
Magnitude of price: Similarly, we can define a scalar quantity, referred to as Magnitude of price,
to measure how ‘expensive’ a price is for the buyer. The Magnitude of price a = (a1, a2) with
respect to the buyer’s Liability Index Threshold λ, denoted by Mλ(a), is defined as the amount of
Buying Power lost in purchasing this price when the buyer’s money has non-negative PLC. It can
be shown that the Magnitude is obtained by the following equation:
M " (a) = a1 + # a2

It can be proved that a buyer is able to purchase an item if the Buying Power of his money is greater
than, or at least equal to, the Magnitude of price – both evaluated with respect to the buyer’s
Liability Index Threshold. This!is because of the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Purchase operation on money x and price a, both with non-negative PLC, is valid if
and only if B" (x) # M " (a) .2 (Proof is straightforward and omitted for brevity.)
1

This statement applies to buying ordinary goods and not the environmental goods described in Section 4. Purchase of
!
environmental
goods increases one’s Buying Power and moves money ‘away’ from the LI Threshold.
2
If the PLC of money is negative, x can absorb certain level of PLC in the price without losing Buying Power, but as
soon as PLC of money becomes zero the above theorem holds.
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For example, if x = $(50, 10) and a = $(35, 8), for λ = 0.6 Buying Power of x is $43.3 and
Magnitude of a is $40.3 (so x can purchase a). For λ = 0.5, Buying Power of x is $40 and
Magnitude of a is $43 (so x cannot purchase a).
The above theorem specifies a necessary and sufficient condition; hence the definitions of Buying
Power and Magnitude provide a rigorous basis for determining affordability.

Figure 3: (a) Buying Power of money; (b) relationship between Marginal Cost of PLC and LI Threshold

2.5

Marginal Cost of PLC

The parameter ρ in the expressions for Buying Power of money and Magnitude of price plays a
critical role in the proposed non-scalar economy. Hereafter, this parameter is referred to as the
Marginal Cost of PLC 3 and represents the impact of PLC on Buying Power of money and
Magnitude of price.
To illustrate this point, consider money x with positive PLC. The Buying Power of x is equal to
x1 " ! x 2 . This means that for every extra dollar of PLC, the Buying Power is reduced further by ρ
dollars4. Note that the total wealth contained in money is intact. In other words, this is not a
‘pollution tax’ that the owner has paid. The presence of PLC only makes a certain amount of
Buying Power inaccessible. Hereafter, we say that some of the Buying Power is locked up against
the PLC. This locked up Buying Power could be released (made accessible to the owner) if the PLC
is reduced. By reducing every dollar of PLC, ρ dollars of Buying Power is released, up to the point
when PLC becomes zero. So ρ is also the marginal benefit of reducing PLC. Likewise, the
Magnitude of price, a1 + ρ a2, increases by ρ dollars for every additional dollar of PLC in the price5.
Hence, the Marginal Cost of PLC, ρ, measures the impact of PLC in reducing Buying Power on one
hand and increasing the perceived Magnitude of price on the other hand. The Marginal Cost of PLC
depends on the LI Threshold and, therefore, in general it would vary among the population. The
3

Our terminology is rather loose here for convenience. To be precise, parameter ρ should be called the Lower Bound on
Marginal Cost of PLC because the prospect of changes in the Liability Index Threshold increases the Marginal Cost of
PLC above this value (Section 5). But for a short period of time, when the Liability Index Threshold is fixed, ρ is
applicable. In general, there is no relationship between Marginal Cost of PLC and the actual marginal cost of pollution.
However, at the sustainable point it may be argued that these two coincide.
4

Mathematically for Buying Power:

5

Mathematically

"M # (a)
= $.
"a2
!

!

"B# (x)
= $ % , when x 2 > 0 and λ is constant.
"x 2
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relationship between ρ and λ is shown in Figure 3-(b). This non-linear relation is very useful as it
allows ρ to assume any positive value and enables us to control ρ by altering the LI Threshold
individually (see Section 3.3).

2.6

Summary and comparison

To summarize the discussions of this Section, consider a simple example regarding the annual
income and expenses of a family (Table 1). The gross annual salary of this family is $(85000, 0).
The PLC of salary is assumed to be zero because, typically, the pollution liability associated with
the operation of employer’s business is transferred to the customers (via the sell operation) or
shareholders (via dividends) and not to employees – see Section 4.
The annual tax imposed on this family is $(35000, 800). The government would accumulate PLC
while running its services and operations. Thus, the Liability Index of tax is calculated and applied
to all collected taxes. The tax ‘deduction’ in non-scalar economy is a purchase operation. In
essence, we are purchasing our share of government services. The net annual income after tax is:
$(85000, 0)$(35000, 800) = $(50000, 800).
Table 1 shows the annual prices for various expenses. Each firm estimates the PLC of its price to
avoid accumulation of PLC within the firm (Section 4). If the family were able to buy these goods,
their net balance would be $(3800, 2200). In the Table, three cases are shown with different
Liability Index Thresholds. For each case, the Magnitude of prices and the final Buying Power left
for the family are shown. For case 3, the LI Threshold is such that the family cannot afford to buy
all of these products. So either they should reduce their consumption or shop around to substitute by
more affordable products.
For the first two cases, this family accumulates $2200 of PLC during this year, which locks up
$2200 or $3300 of their Buying Power for LI Thresholds of 0.5 and 0.4 respectively. If they do
nothing to reduce this PLC, after several years of accumulation, potentially a significant amount of
Buying Power could become inaccessible. However, their wealth still belongs to them and is in
their bank account so their incentive to release this locked up Buying Power grows stronger. It is
shown later (Section 3.3) that their LI Threshold may also be lowered. With a lower LI Threshold,
the Marginal Cost of PLC goes up and more Buying Power is locked up against the same level of
PLC. The incentive to reduce PLC grows stronger still.
The Table also contains a comparison with an ‘equivalent’ situation in the scalar economy, whereby
the same dollar values for cost of pollution (taxes or cost of permits) have been added to the price.
In this case, the family pays $2200 of ‘tax’ regardless of their previous history. The cost of
pollution is buried in the prices and is not visible to the buyer. Payment of these pollution charges
generates revenue for others and the family would hope that the agency who received the revenue
will do something to undo the damage to the environment, but this is not enforced by the economy.
There is no visible accumulation of the environmental cost and no economic impact specific to
accumulation, so if the cost is not significant at this stage, it would be swamped by other concerns
and is unlikely to cause a change of behavior.

Table 1: Comparison of income and expenses for a family in both economies
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Creation and Removal of Pollution Liability

In non-scalar economy, operations of purchase and sell result in transfer of PLC from one
economic entity to another. Thus, the pollution liability circulates in the economy. However, it has
to be created because of appropriation, and removed from circulation due to provisioning activity.
It is proposed here to have a separate entity charged with overseeing the creation and removal of
pollution liability. For management of privately owned resources, the economy needs external
organizations to enforce ownership rights. Because the global commons are shared, there is no need
for a legal and judiciary system to enforce ownership. What is required is an independent
accounting authority to keep track of appropriation and provisioning activities. Let us refer to this
as the Accounting Authority for Pollution Liability (AAPL).
AAPL is created by all those countries that have decided to adopt the non-scalar economy. AAPL is
independent of the government and is not a ‘regulator’. Its role is not to prescribe certain practices
and enforce environmental standards or targets. It merely keeps track (account) of appropriation and
provisioning levels.
AAPL is responsible for three primary functions: (i) creation of pollution liability as a result of
appropriation and assigning this liability to the appropriator; (ii) removal of pollution liability as a
result of provisioning activity; and (iii) imposing a suitable Liability Index Range (LI Range) on
each participating country based on an internationally agreed formula. These functions are briefly
described below.

3.1

Creation of Pollution Liability

AAPL monitors the appropriation of global resources and, in response, assigns suitable values of
PLC to the appropriator. The price of appropriation is of the form (0, b), which the appropriator
has to purchase. Note that the Wealth Component of this price is zero. Hence, AAPL does not
receive any revenue (Buying Power) as a result of pollution. AAPL does not impose any ceiling on
the amount of appropriation of a resource. It calculates and assigns PLC based on every unit of
resource, e.g. one cubic meter of air or water polluted.

3.2

Removal of Pollution Liability

Let us define any activity that attempts to undo the effect of pollution and restore the resource to its
original condition as provisioning function6. In the non-scalar economy, the entity engaged in
provisioning can transfer some PLC to AAPL. This transfer can be viewed as a sell operation which
has a price in the form of (0, c). The PLC transferred to AAPL after this operation is removed from
circulation. Once again, there is no transfer of Wealth Component during removal to/from AAPL.
Different scenarios for PLC removal can be envisaged. For example:
a) Individual or community initiatives: These initiatives may involve restoration, clean up,
waste management and similar activities accredited by AAPL.
b) Environmental Firms: The core competency of these firms is to restore the damage caused by
pollution. The ‘product’ sold by these firms is called an environmental good and has a price
with negative PLC of the form (e1, -e2)7. By purchasing an environmental good, the buyer loses
$e1 of WLC, with a corresponding Buying Power loss of $e1, and also reduces his/her PLC by
$e2 , which may increase Buying Power by up to $ ! e2 . Depending on buyer’s LI Threshold
this purchase could have a positive return and increase the buyer’s Buying Power. In addition,
the environmental firms may return dividends with negative PLC to their shareholders.
6

We distinguish between abatement and provisioning activities. Pollution abatement reduces the rate of creation of
PLC during manufacturing or delivery of a service. Provisioning activity is concerned with clean up after the pollution
has been created. The environmental sector in non-scalar economy could have both of these activities.
7
We use the negative sign to emphasize that the PLC of price is negative. That is, e2 is the absolute value of PLC.
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c) Discounting due to natural regeneration: An agreed level of PLC reduction is applied to all
on regular time intervals to represent the natural regeneration capacity of the environment.
Figure 4 shows a representation of PLC creation and removal functions as a ‘leaky bucket’. The
PLC is created as a result of appropriation and flows into the economy. The rate of in-flow of PLC
can be reduced by abatement activities and better technology. The PLC circulates in the economy
and as the in-flow continues the level of accumulation (the depth of the bucket) increases. At the
same time, the bucket is leaking - there is some outflow due to natural discounting and some due to
provisioning, if any. The environmental sector influences the amount of PLC in circulation via
abatement and provisioning activities. It is shown in Section 5 that the proposed non-scalar
economy always reaches an Equilibrium Point, at which the bucket depth remains at a constant
level. It is also shown that it is very easy for the society to control the depth of bucket at the
Equilibrium Point by modifying a single macro-economic parameter.
Abatement activity
reduces this in-flow of
PLC

Creation of Pollution
Liability as a result of
direct appropriation

PLC in
circulation
Removal of PLC as a result
of natural regeneration
(discounting)

Amount of PLC in
circulation - k
(depth of the bucket)

Removal of PLC as a result
of provisioning activity

Figure 4: Creation and removal of PLC and the impact of environmental sector

3.2.1
The unit price of environmental resources
During creation and removal of PLC, AAPL has to put a dollar value on a ‘unit’ of polluted
resource. For example, if atmosphere and water are selected to be managed by the non-scalar
economy, there is a unit price associated with appropriation of one cubic meter of air or water - say,
$(0, a) and $(0, w) respectively.
One way to incorporate different pollutants into this model is to agree on a ‘safe’ level of
concentration of each pollutant per unit of resource. If the appropriator emits this safe level, one
unit of resource has been made unavailable to others to use as waste-sink.
A key feature of the non-scalar economy is that it is not sensitive to the magnitude of unit prices,
such as a and w in the above example. Any number will do as long as it is applied consistently. The
reason is that the magnitude of PLC by itself does not have any economic significance, what matters
is the relative magnitude of the product of PLC and ρ in comparison to WLC. For example,
consider X = $(100, 80) and Y = $(100, 3). Without further information, no assessment can be
made about the significance of markedly different PLCs ($80 versus $3) in X and Y. This is
because ρ can be made arbitrarily large or small depending on the assigned Liability Index
Thresholds. For example, if the LI Thresholds of owners of X and Y were 0.9 and 0.2 respectively,
X would have more Buying Power than Y ($91 versus $88).

3.3

Imposition of Liability Index Range on Participating Countries

The third role of AAPL is to impose a Liability Index Range on every country that has adopted the
non-scalar economy based on an agreed formula. The Liability Index Range is defined as a range of
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allowed LI Threshold values between a maximum and a minimum. The LI Thresholds of
individuals, firms, and other entities within the country must always be less than the upper bound of
the imposed LI Range and are recommended to be within this range. The actual LI Thresholds are
chosen by the government based on their economic policy – see Figure 5.

Figure 5: (a) Variation of LI Range in response to increases in per-capita PLC in circulation; (b) Mapping the LI
Thresholds to new values in response to change of LI Range

For example, if the LI Range imposed on a country is [0.40, 0.45], the LI Thresholds of economic
entities in this country cannot exceed 0.45. It is also recommended that these be in the inclusive
range of 0.40 to 0.45. The government might assign everyone the same LI Threshold from this
range or adopt a more sophisticated policy (Section 5).
AAPL determines the Liability Index Range of every country based on a formula agreed by all the
participating countries. The exact nature of this formula is outside the scope of this paper. However,
the LI Range is required to be a monotonically decreasing function of per-capita PLC in
circulation. Figure 5-(a) shows one possible example where the LI Range is progressively
decreased in response to the growth of per-capita PLC in circulation. Note that calculating the
amount of PLC in circulation is straightforward for AAPL, because AAPL is the only authority
responsible for creation and removal of PLC and can monitor the PLC transfer in/out of the
economy due to import/export.
3.3.1
The impact of lowering the Liability Index Threshold of an entity
For an economic agent, lowering the LI Threshold has the effect of increasing the Marginal Cost of
PLC - see Figure 3-(b). Consequently:
•

For every dollar of PLC in money, more buying power is locked up. This applies
retrospectively to all accumulated PLC.

•

For every dollar of PLC in prices, the perceived Magnitude of price would be higher and
more Buying Power is lost due to purchase.

•

The perceived return is higher when purchasing an environmental good or investing in the
environmental sector.

So altogether, a lower LI Threshold encourages reduced consumption, especially of goods and
services that have high PLC in their prices, and more investment in environmental sector with the
purpose of reducing one’s accumulated PLC.
3.3.2
The impact of lowering the Liability Index Range of a country
Typically, when the LI Range of a country is changed, the LI Thresholds of economic entities are
mapped to new values within the new range - Figure 5-(b). So, when the LI Range is lowered,
everyone would experience a corresponding reduction of LI Threshold. Consequently, the whole
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economy must reduce consumption, especially of goods and services that are pollution intensive,
and increase investment in the environmental sector.
The combination of these effects could trigger cooperative and competitive incentives to reduce the
total PLC in circulation. In other words, the LI Range influences the balance between the amount of
investment and effort devoted to pollution abatement and provisioning on one hand and production
of goods and services for people on the other hand. It determines the size of the environmental
sector versus other sectors.

4

Market Interactions

In non-scalar economy, two categories of firms can be distinguished. The first category or
‘traditional’ firms are called wealth generating firms and are engaged in production of goods and
services for humans. A distinguishing feature of these firms is that the PLC of their prices and
dividends is non-negative. The second category is referred to as environmental firms. These firms
are engaged in environmental restoration and their products are referred to as environmental goods.
The price of environmental goods and dividends of these firms have negative PLC.
Table 2 shows typical transactions for both categories. The first three transactions are similar:
1. The firm may directly be engaged in appropriation of global commons such as discharge of
waste into the atmosphere or oceans. In this case, the pollution liability associated with these
activities is created by AAPL and sold to the firm (Section 3.1).
2. The firm almost always creates pollution indirectly by purchasing other goods for its
operation, such as electricity, transport, computers, raw materials, and so forth. The PLC
associated with these is transferred to the firm via purchase operation.
3. The firm pays for its workforce (subtraction operation).
For wealth generating firms, the output is a product or service sold to the intended market. During
the sell operation a certain amount of PLC as specified by the price is transferred to the firm’s
customers. Three cases can be identified:
a) If the PLC of price under-estimates the total pollution, directly and indirectly, caused by the
firm’s operation then the sell operation does not transfer the entire PLC to customers and there
would be some accumulation of PLC within the firm. This PLC could either be transferred to
the shareholders via dividends (who probably would not be pleased) or retained by the firm
causing reduction of Buying Power and perhaps lowering the LI Threshold - Figure 8.
b) If the PLC of price over-estimates the pollution caused by the firm’s operation, perhaps to
compensate for the under-estimation of PLC during the previous offering, the firm depletes its
accumulated PLC. However, customers perceive a higher Magnitude for the price and
depending on their Marginal Cost of PLC may reject the product. Furthermore, the PLC of price
clearly demonstrates to them that the higher Magnitude is due to polluting impact of firm’s
operation and not any other variation in cost factors.
c) If the PLC is accurately estimated, the pricing strategy is referred to as neutral pricing (neutral
with respect to PLC accumulation). It can be shown that this is the best strategy in the long run.
(The proof is outside the scope of this paper and will be subject of future publications.)
Table 2 also demonstrates that it is easy for the firm to adopt a neutral pricing strategy as the nonscalar economy provides all necessary information to work out the balance of PLC.

13

Non-Scalar Economy

In the case of environmental firms, the provisioning activity results in transfer of PLC to AAPL.
The firm may sell a number of environmental goods. The price of an environmental good has
negative PLC. Purchasing an environmental good reduces the buyer’s accumulated PLC and
transfers certain amount of Wealth Component to the firm. The former helps the buyer to manage
Wealth Generating Firms
Description
Capital and assets
Pollution liability received directly from
AAPL (purchase)
Purchase of supplies
(may include additional assignment of
pollution liability at the point of sale or
after purchase)
Payment of wages
(subtraction)

Environmental Firms
Description
Capital and assets
Pollution liability received directly from
AAPL (purchase)
Purchase of supplies
(may include additional assignment of
pollution liability at the point of sale or
after purchase)
Payment of wages
(subtraction)

Value
(x1, x2)
(0, a2)

(b1, b2)

(c1, c2)

Value
(x1, x2)
(0, a2)

(b1, b2)

(c1, c2)

Total pollution credit from AAPL
Revenue for sale of environmental goods
(sell operation)

(0, d2)
(e1, -e2)

Total revenue from sales
(sell operation)

(d1, d2)

Balance

(x1-b1-c1+d1, x2+a2+b2-c2-d2)

Balance

(x1-b1-c1+e1, x2+a2+b2-c2-d2+e2)

(y1, y2)

Dividend returned to shareholder
of the form (subtraction)

(y1, -y2)

Dividend returned to shareholder
of the form (subtraction)

Table 2: The transactions of wealth generating and environmental provisioning firms

the PLC accumulation in his/her money. The latter compensates the firm for the cost of privately
owned resources, such as labor and materials, used for its operation. For example, if the buyer’s
money is $(100, 40) and his LI Threshold is 0.4 (Buying Power = $40), purchasing an
environmental good priced at $(10, -10) results in $(90, 30) with Buying Power of $45.
The environmental firms do not generate wealth or Buying Power directly as these firms are
focused on environmental restoration as opposed to providing amenities for humans. Their output
unlocks existing Buying Power that has been made inaccessible due to PLC.

5

Equilibrium and Sustainable Points

In this Section, it is shown that a non-scalar economy with a monotonically decreasing function for
variations of LI Range achieves an equilibrium state if at all feasible, that is, if the marginal cost is
finite. The Equilibrium Point is defined as a state of economy when the per-capita PLC in
circulation is held at a constant level (see Figure 4). At this point the marginal benefit of reducing
per-capita PLC in circulation becomes equal to its marginal cost.
Let us denote the per-capita PLC in circulation by k. It can be shown that the marginal benefit of
reducing k is bounded within the range of [ ", "ˆ ] where " = (1# $k ) / $k , "ˆ = (1# $2k ) / $2k , and "k is

!

!

!

!

Figure 6: The bounds on the marginal cost of reducing per-capita PLC in circulation
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the LI Threshold imposed at k. (The proof is outside the scope of this paper and will be subject of
future publications.) As for the marginal cost of reducing k, the shape of this function cannot be
ascertained at this stage and would depend on the efficiency of the environmental sector, level of
competition, spending on R&D and advancements in technology. However, evaluation of this
function would be quite feasible given the exact accounting information readily available when the
non-scalar economy is operational. It is reasonable to assume that this is a monotonically
decreasing function of k due to economies of scale and usually high establishment cost of
infrastructure for abatement and provisioning.
Figure 7 shows the Equilibrium Points as the intersection points of a hypothetical marginal cost
function with three possible marginal benefit functions based on different rates of lowering LI
Threshold "k in response to rising k, denoted by α in the Figure. In this Figure, only the upper
bound of marginal benefit ( "ˆ ) is shown. The actual value would be somewhere between the upper
and lower bound (ρ) as shown in Figure 6. Clearly, the marginal benefit of reducing k grows to
arbitrarily large values in response to accumulation of PLC irrespective of unit prices associated
!
with global resources. Hence, for any finite marginal cost and regardless of the shape of this
! be an intersection point.
function, there would
This mathematical property of the marginal benefit function is desirable and matches the
cumulative characteristics of pollution in the real world. The same polluting activity may have
negligible impact in a clean environment (k small). However, if it occurs at the time when the
capacity of the resource in absorbing further pollution is at its limit (k large), this extra pollution
might be enough to ‘push us over the edge’ and trigger irreversible and undesirable changes.
Similarly, in non-scalar economy, the economic impact of pollution is amplified in response to
cumulative context of pollution. By tuning the parameter α, the economy models the sensitivity of
the environmental resource to accumulation of pollution. For example, by lowering α, capacity of
the resource is modeled to be higher and Equilibrium Point occurs at a higher value of k - Figure 7.

Figure 7: Equilibrium Points for different rates (α) of lowering LI Threshold in response to rising k

At the Equilibrium Point, the balance between provisioning, pollution abatement and appropriation
activities are maintained at a level that does not lead to further accumulation of per-capita PLC.
This does not imply that improvements in the standard of living are stopped. It merely states that
the environmental sector has to grow with the economy or become more effective in reducing the
polluting side effects of generating wealth.
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The Equilibrium Point, however, may not be a Sustainable Point because the accumulated level of
pollution at the equilibrium may still be excessive for the resource. It is however evident from the
above discussions that the value of k at the Equilibrium Point can be altered by adjusting the
parameter α above. In this way, by tuning a single parameter the society is able to steer the
economy towards a sustainable point. This ‘trial and error’ method is also used in current schemes
for establishing tax levels or environmental targets [1][3][8].
In the above derivation, we have assumed that everyone has the same LI Threshold within a given
LI Range. While this is a possible policy for the government to adopt, a better incentive structure
can be created by assigning different LI Thresholds to economic agents based on the level of
pollution that they support. For example, the government policy may assign progressively lower LI
Thresholds based on the accumulated PLC by the entity within the bounds of the LI Range - see
Figure 8 for an example.

Figure 8: Possible variation of LI Threshold within the LI Range as a result of accumulation of PLC

6

Implementation Issues

Changing the underlying structure of price and money may appear disruptive and impractical.
However, for a given environmental objective, implementation of non-scalar economy may be
easier than current schemes for the following reasons:
1. Electronic Transactions: The non-scalar economy is most suited to electronic
transactions, which are becoming almost ubiquitous. A change of software is required to
implement the new mathematical model and its operations (addition, subtraction,
purchase and sell). It is also necessary to attach every debit and credit account to a
Liability Index Threshold monitored and adjusted by the regulator. However, these
changes are quite feasible. It is also possible to support cash transactions in non-scalar
economy (details are omitted for brevity).
2. Monitoring infrastructure: The existing infrastructure, deployed for other schemes
could initially be used for non-scalar economy. There is no need to have everything
ready on the first day and the scope of monitoring can be extended later. In general, the
required monitoring infrastructure for non-scalar economy is similar to other schemes.
3. No dilemma: The introduction of non-scalar economy is not a zero-sum game and there
is no need to have any losers because no particular sector or group is unfairly targeted.
4. Backward Compatible: (See below.)
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5. No international free riding: (See below.)
In the remainder of this Section, more details on items 4 and 5 are presented.

6.1

Backward compatibility

All the mathematical operations of the non-scalar economy are reduced to the current system - and
the intuitive understandings coincide - when the Liability Index Threshold is set to one. In this case,
people can ignore the PLC of price and money as the Marginal Cost of PLC is zero.
Consequently, the non-scalar economy can be started by converting all monies and prices into two
dimensional numbers with the second component set to zero. As there is no existing per-capita PLC
in circulation (k = 0), AAPL would also set the Liability Index Range to [1.00, 1.00] which forces
all Liability Index Thresholds to be 1.00. AAPL starts assigning pollution liability in major
appropriation points that probably have existing infrastructure for monitoring. These include power
generation plants, major mining and manufacturing firms and other pollution intensive industries.
The unit price of global resources is selected to be a reasonable number but it does not need to be
equal to the (unknown) cost of pollution.
The PLC generated by these firms appears in their prices and is transferred to buyers. At this stage,
buyers show little resistance to PLC of price, as it has no economic impact. Nevertheless, the PLC
gradually trickles down to others and circulates within the economy. After a while, everyone would
have some PLC and the economy as a whole would have accumulated a certain level of per-capita
PLC (k > 0). In response to this accumulation and based on a formula known to all, the Liability
Index Range is lowered, say to [0.95, 0.97], which raises the Marginal Cost of PLC slightly and
locks up some Buying Power. As this process continues, people’s understanding of the new
economy improves. They can also assess future opportunities in response to further lowering of
Liability Index Range and adjust business practices, purchasing behavior and investment choices.
The environmental sector experiences a significant growth and promotes innovation as investment
in this sector becomes attractive. It is generally agreed that even current pollution regulations have
resulted in the growth of pollution control sector [12]. After a period of transition, which can be
made as long as necessary by altering the rate of variation of LI Range, the non-scalar economy
diverges significantly from the current economy and a balanced strategy on appropriation and care
for natural resources would have to be incorporated in every economic decision.

6.2

International free-riding

It is of course beneficial to start the non-scalar economy with an initial set of countries that are
economically strong. These would agree on what resources to be managed and the parameters of
model, and create AAPL for overseeing the appropriation and provisioning of these resources.
Those countries that do not join, would incur some economic cost when trading with the non-scalar
economy group. To illustrate this point consider the trade between two such countries, country A
with non-scalar economy, and country B with current economy as shown in Figure 9. An exporter
in B intends to sell some good to an importer in A. The scalar export price in B only reflects the
cost of privately owned resources and is denoted by b1. Of course a scalar price cannot be used in
A, so AAPL has to translate this into a two dimensional price. Given that B’s economy does not
provide any information about the PLC of price, this component has to be estimated. One sensible
approach would be to estimate the average Liability Index of the B’s economy8, denoted in the
Figure by ! , and calculate the PLC of export prices of B using this common Index. In this case,

8

Liability Index of an economy is defined as the Liability Index of the sum of all monies in the economy or
alternatively as the ratio of the per-capita PLC in circulation over the sum of per-capita PLC and per-capita Wealth
Component. Note that it is straightforward for AAPL to estimate this Index for a non-scalar economy. Likewise, based
on industrial and environmental practices and observed per-capita PLC in circulation in non-scalar economies, it would
be possible to extrapolate and provide a reasonable estimate for other (scalar) economies.
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b2 = ! b1 /(1 " ! ) . This PLC is then transferred to the importer in A when the purchase takes place.
Note the following:
•

Transferring an estimated PLC to the importer in A is not a punitive measure or trade
protection scheme to discourage imports from B. It is an impartial and honest attempt to
provide a fair estimate for the PLC of price because the scalar economy does not provide the
required information. After all, it would be neither fair nor correct to set this value to zero
because almost no product can be produced without some level of PLC.

•

AAPL is not interfering in the economy of B. The estimated PLC is transferred to an entity
in A, who is bound by the rules of non-scalar economy.

In the other direction, consider an exporter in A with an export price of (a1 , a 2 ) . As a result of this
export, from the perspective of AAPL, a PLC to the value of a 2 would have to be transferred to the
buyer in B. This is recorded by AAPL as a transfer to B’s economy and is used to update the
estimated Liability Index of B. The importer in B would probably not care about the PLC
component of price and has no incentive to reduce the accumulation of PLC in B (in AAPL’s
books). Once again, recording the transfer of PLC during an export operation is not a punitive
measure and is not interference in the affairs of B. It is simply an attempt to keep account of PLC,
because a sell operation can only cause transfer of PLC and is not a removal operation.

Figure 9: Translation between scalar and non-scalar prices during trade between scalar and non-scalar
economies

As a result, the scalar economy B is disadvantaged. First, their export prices might look
uncompetitive to buyers in A for reasons that are beyond the control of producers in B. Second, the
economy of B is used as a ‘dumping ground’ of PLC by exporters in A which raises the average
Liability Index of B even further, reducing the competitiveness of its exports. Because the economy
of B is not equipped with proper mechanisms to control and manage the PLC accumulation, the
situation would progressively get worse. The export industries in B starve and to produce cheaper
goods may resort to environmentally inferior techniques. This would prompt AAPL to update its
estimate of B’s Liability Index and the cycle continues. The political and economic pressures may
prompt some countries in the scalar group to revise their policy and adopt the non-scalar economy.
By joining late, these countries have missed the early transition phase of implementation in
synchronicity with other nations (Section 6.1). Their environmental sector is probably less
developed and their transition is likely to be harder.
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Comparison with other Incentive-Based Schemes

On the surface, it might appear that the distinctions between non-scalar economy and existing
incentive-based schemes are merely notational. For example, the Magnitude of a price (a1, a2) is
‘ a1 + " a2 ’. Is this really different from the scalar price a1 that has been raised by ‘ρ a2’ due to
pollution taxes or charges? When the Buying Power is equal to ‘x1 - ρ x2’, is this not the same as
spending an extra ‘ρ x2’ dollars on charges associated with the environment? In this Section, we
demonstrate that the differences between the two economies are profound with respect to both the
accuracy of price signal and the economic incentives.
Let us consider the prices first. Assume that there are two products of same quality, priced at P =
$(80, 20) and Q = $(20, 80). (We ignore other spurious influences such as brand loyalty.) To
simplify comparison, let the buyer’s LI Threshold be 0.5 (ρ = 1.0), which results in Magnitude of
both P and Q to be $100. Despite having the same Magnitude, buyers could easily recognise that P
and Q production methods have affected the environment differently. In addition, the economic
impact of purchasing P or Q would also be different.
It may be argued that similar information about the pollution effects of production could be
provided in the current economy using mandatory labels accompanying the product. But
determination of full effects of pollution in current economy is very difficult [7]. Production of
goods causes pollution both directly and indirectly. While measuring the former is similar in both
economies, the accounting for the indirect pollution would be error prone and quite complex in the
current economy. The non-scalar economy accurately and automatically calculates the precise
breakdown of price without any need for regulatory supervision. The incentives in the scalar
economy, on the other hand, are probably in favour of hiding the true environmental cost of
production, which is likely to lead to errors in estimation of this cost. These errors propagate when
one product is used as an input for another production. The true contribution of environmental
resources is diluted, obscured, and eventually lost among the ‘noise’ of other cost factors.
Therefore, in the non-scalar economy:
I. The price contains precise information about all the pollution caused by production,
readily accessible to all and without a need for government mandates or supervision.
II. The accuracy of information in the price is persistent and is not lost in the course of
economic transactions.
Consider a slightly different situation when the price for P is in fact $(85, 20). With the scalar price,
P is more expensive than Q ($105 versus $100) and would be rejected in the market. The producers
of P could try to inform consumers about the merits of their environmentally friendly production
technique. Consumers must first trust the propaganda and then face a dilemma, because a decision
to forego their self-interest and buy the more expensive product would be contrary to the economic
‘reality’ signalled by the price. In the non-scalar economy there is no dilemma. Consumers can
always be confident that an economic decision to purchase is consistent with their social
obligations. They could safely ignore any advertising pleas for support and environmental-sounding
names or logos. The price provides a full and accurate story.
Economic decisions, however, vary in the population and depending on the LI Threshold there
could be some who are more sensitive to PLC in prices. If the LI Threshold of a market segment
were lower than 0.5, say 0.47, the perceived Magnitudes of P and Q would be $107.6 and $110.2
respectively. This is not a subsidy for P. It is an economic differentiation influenced by the past
buying behaviour and the level of pollution supported.
Therefore, in the non-scalar economy:
III. The information contained in the price alone is sufficient to provide a basis for an
informed economic decision.
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IV. Consumers can always use their economic judgment to support a product, as this is
consistent with their social and environmental obligations.
V. It is possible to differentiate between people based on their history of supporting pollution.
Having established that the non-scalar economy is endowed with superior signals, we now turn our
attention to economic incentives. In the current incentive-based schemes, the cost of natural
resources is paid through taxes or purchase of permits and added to the cost of privately owned
resources. By paying for the resource, the buyers could feel that their obligation toward the
environment has been transferred to another party who has received the revenue and should now
engage in undoing the damage. In non-scalar economy, on the other hand, the accountability for
reducing PLC is always held by the entity benefiting from the pollution.

Initial Money

Price

Scalar Economy

Non-scalar Economy
(assume ! = 1)

$500

$(500, 0)

$400
(includes $100 Pollution tax)

$(300, 100)

Balance of Money after purchase

$100

$(200, 100)

Buying Power after purchase

$100

$100

Table 3: Comparison of two ‘equivalent’ purchases in scalar and non-scalar economies

Consider the two individuals of Table 3. For ease of comparison, the Liability Index Threshold of
the individual in non-scalar economy is 0.5 (ρ = 1.0). Both start with an initial Buying Power of
$500 and purchase a good with the Magnitude of $400, which includes $100 due to ‘cost’ of
pollution. After the purchase, both are left with a total Buying Power of $100.
Even if we ignore all the previous discussions, economically, these individuals are not equivalent.
They both posses the same Buying Power but they differ with respect to their total wealth, the
signals received from the economy, and their incentives for future economic activity.
In the scalar economy, a $100 ‘tax’ has been paid and lost. The buyer would hope that the recipient
of this revenue would use it to develop alternative production techniques or help the environment.
But no such guarantee is enforced by the economy. In fact, revenues raised by pollution taxes are
often diverted to other programs instead of pollution abatement [13].
The buyer in the non-scalar economy, on the other hand, has supported a product with $100 of PLC.
The transfer of this PLC to his money does not create revenue for anyone else. In this process, he
does not lose any wealth either but $100 of his Buying Power is locked up (based on the LI
Threshold of 0.5). This can be unlocked provided he reduces this PLC. Reduction of PLC can only
be achieved by working or investing on the environment, such as buying an environmental good,
and cannot be substituted by any other activity. This tight causal relationship is enforced by the
economy as opposed to a social contract. More importantly, the semantic separation between WLC
and PLC and the fact that economic operations keep track of both components leads to
accumulation of PLC in time. In this example, receiving $100 of PLC might not be significant if
viewed in isolation, but with the passage of time and going through many similar purchases, a large
portion of the owner’s Buying Power could be locked up.
Therefore, in the non-scalar economy:
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VI. The accumulation of pollution liability is visible and has a progressively higher economic
impact. Thus, of necessity, it leads to changes in behaviour and investment strategies.
VII. The economy is accountable for pollution created and must invest some effort in
restoration and abatement.
VIII. Transfer of PLC does not generate revenue for anyone and, therefore, there are no
perverse incentives in the economy.
IX. The responsibility to reduce PLC is shared by all and is not monopolised by governments
or people of good will. In particular, the bulk of responsibility rests on people who benefit
most from appropriation directly or indirectly.
We now summarise other comparative points that were alluded to in the previous sections:
X. In the non-scalar economy, the unit price of pollution to global resources can be set to an
arbitrary value and there is no need to estimate the true cost of pollution (Section 3.2.1).
XI. Non-scalar economy provides a unified framework as opposed to a narrowly defined target
for a particular pollutant. New pollutants and appropriation modes can be added to this
framework and the scope of monitoring widened gradually. This may be viewed as a
generalisation of ‘bubble’ and ‘netting’ provisions in current schemes [1].
XII. International implementation of non-scalar economy does not require a strict global
consensus and does not suffer from the free rider problem (Section 6.2).
XIII. The non-scalar economy has been designed to be backward compatible with the current
economy. So while the differences between the two economies might seem revolutionary,
it is possible to evolve from the current economy gradually and without significant
disruption (Section 6.1).
XIV. The proposed system is not ‘hard coded’ with a pre-conceived notion of sustainability and
is not prescriptive about the target levels of environmental purity that is desirable. It
provides appropriate macro-economic parameters for the society to control and affect the
level of pollution at the Equilibrium Point (Section 5)

7.1

Co-existence with other schemes

There may be local environmental targets that are more suited to be managed using existing
schemes. For example, the regulator may wish to impose a ceiling on emissions of a particular
pollutant with detrimental effects on the local ecosystem using taxes, permits or command and
control. This may be required because the non-scalar economy would achieve an overall reduction
of pollution but may not be specific enough for this pollutant. In general, it is possible for other
schemes to co-exist with the non-scalar economy.

8

Conclusions

This paper proposes an approach to remove the commons dilemma by redesigning the concept of
money and price based on two-dimensional numbers. Despite the simplicity of the underlying
mathematical model, the proposed scheme is effective in aligning the cooperative and competitive
incentives to attain a sustainable balance between usage and care for the commons. In this scheme,
there is a complete alignment between economic prosperity and sustainability. All else being equal,
the economy mirrors the state of the environment. In other words, the economy is affected
negatively when the environmental condition deteriorates and vice versa.
Moreover, the proposed model does not suffer from the free rider problem; does not require
accurate estimation of the true cost of pollution; is simple to implement and backward compatible
with the current economy.
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